Start with the number: 94.7 percent. According to the leaked records, that is the share of the Hana Bank Panama branch's correspondent account activity that Deutsche Bank's own review labeled high-risk in early 2019. If the figure is accurate, Deutsche had a defensible reason to cut the branch off from dollar clearing, and Hana's complaint that nobody warned it looks thin. I'm not going to pretend otherwise.
The more important question is who gets to make that judgment, and who checks them.
Dollar clearing is a chokepoint. A handful of giant banks decide which foreign lenders get access to the world's reserve currency, and they do it privately, with no hearing, no appeal and no public record. Regulators demand that these banks police their clients, so the banks do, and mostly in secret. We learn what happened only when documents leak. That is not oversight. It is a system that runs on trust in institutions that have not earned it.
Deutsche Bank is a poor candidate for the role of conscientious gatekeeper. It was fined roughly $630 million in 2017 over $10 billion in Russian 'mirror trades.' It paid $150 million to New York regulators in 2020 for keeping Jeffrey Epstein as a client while the warning signs piled up. It has been a recurring name in money-laundering investigations for years. This is the institution now telling us, through a spokesperson who won't discuss specific clients, that it has 'strengthened financial crime controls.'
The bank's other claim is that it spent €7 billion on controls between 2019 and 2025. That sounds like a lot, because it is meant to. But a spending figure is not an outcome. It says nothing about how many suspicious flows were stopped, how many were waved through, or who got dropped and who got kept. Banks love to cite what they spend on compliance because it can't be checked. Nobody gets credit for the crime that didn't happen, and nobody outside the building can verify the books.
So the pattern is familiar. Smaller and poorer banks, often in jurisdictions like Panama that the rich world already treats with suspicion, get cut off quickly. When a giant fails, the cost is a fine, paid from shareholders' money, with an apology and a promise to do better. Individual executives rarely lose their freedom. Their lives go on. The institution moves on to the next quarter. If the rules were applied evenly, the biggest launderers would not be the banks with the most lawyers.
The right response is not to pity Hana or to cheer for Deutsche. It is to demand that the gatekeeping power be accountable to the public that licenses it. That means publishing far more about how correspondent-banking decisions are made. It means regulators who audit the outcomes of compliance, not just the budgets. It means personal liability when senior executives sign off on systems they know don't work. And it means being honest that a leak, not a supervisor, is what put this story in front of us.
The documents show a bank sorting clients by risk. What they can't show is whether the sorting is honest, because the people who decide that are the same ones who have repeatedly failed the test themselves. A private institution with this record should not be trusted to grade everyone else's homework unsupervised.


