Let's get one thing straight before the reflexive outrage begins: talking to Kim Jong Un is not the scandal. For years the Left argued that isolating Pyongyang and waiting for collapse was not a policy but a prayer. Obama's "strategic patience" let the arsenal grow, and Biden's standing offer to talk with no preconditions amounted to a voicemail greeting. If Trump can get a real process going, he deserves credit. Democrats who sneer at the meeting itself are defending a failed status quo.
But look at what is actually on offer here: a possible encounter that, by Trump's own account, depends on Xi Jinping. The White House says nothing is scheduled. Beijing says it knows of no invitation. Kim's sister says Pyongyang sees no need for talks while Washington maintains what it calls hostile policies. That is not diplomacy. It is a rumor with a photo-op attached.
We have seen this movie. Singapore in 2018 produced a vague, nonbinding statement and a lot of television. Hanoi in 2019 collapsed because nobody had done the unglamorous work of deciding what each side would give up and in what order. The DMZ handshake was great theater. In the years since, North Korea has expanded its weapons programs, and it has found a patron in Moscow, supplying munitions and, by most accounts, troops for Russia's war in Ukraine, in exchange for money and, potentially, military technology. Kim is no longer a supplicant desperate for sanctions relief. He has Russian cover, Chinese tolerance and a constitution that calls his nuclear status irreversible. Why would he pay for a handshake he can get for free?
That is the heart of the problem. Summitry works when it ratifies a deal negotiated by people who know the file: arms-control specialists, Korea hands, sanctions lawyers, allies in Seoul and Tokyo who live within range of the consequences. This administration has spent its time hollowing out the State Department and treating career diplomats as enemies of the people. Now it wants to improvise a historic breakthrough in the middle of someone else's summit, on someone else's soil, at the pleasure of someone else's president.
And that someone is Xi. Trump's formulation, that a Kim meeting depends on China, quietly concedes that Beijing holds the key to the Korean peninsula and that Washington must ask politely. Xi, who is already across the table on trade, gets to play indispensable broker, and he will expect something for it. What does that cost? Tariff relief? Softer language on Taiwan? Silence on technology controls? A president who confuses attention with leverage tends to pay in coin he doesn't realize he is spending. The Russia-China-U.S. meeting scheduled the same week should make anyone nervous about who is setting the agenda.
There is also a question the Right never has to answer when Trump does this: who is the audience? The real constituency for these summits is the American viewer who wants a president who looks like a dealmaker. Koreans in Seoul and Busan are not watching for the drama. They want to know whether the missiles stop, whether a negotiated freeze is on the table, whether anyone is willing to talk about arms control instead of a denuclearization fantasy that Pyongyang has laughed off for years. A serious Democratic position would say so plainly: yes to engagement, yes to a freeze and verification, yes to allied coordination, and no to a spectacle that hands a nuclear-armed dictator legitimacy for nothing.
That is the line the Left should hold. We should not defend the old taboo against talking. We should insist that talking be worth something. If Trump walks into a room with Kim without a negotiated framework, he will walk out with a photograph. Kim will keep the legitimacy, the bombs and the friends in Moscow and Beijing. The rest of us will keep the risk.


