Israeli Election Pits Netanyahu Against Former Military Chief Eisenkot

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Israel is preparing for parliamentary elections that will pit Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu against opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot, a retired lieutenant general and former Israel Defense Forces chief of staff.

Polling cited in the summaries places Eisenkot ahead of Netanyahu’s Likud party. Israel’s electoral system requires a governing coalition to hold at least 61 seats in parliament, meaning the eventual winner will need support from other parties to form a government.

Eisenkot served as IDF chief of staff from 2015 to 2019 and later joined Netanyahu’s wartime cabinet after the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attack. He subsequently resigned from the administration amid disagreements with the prime minister.

Political analyst Dahlia Scheindlin said an Eisenkot-led government would seek a state commission of inquiry into the Oct. 7 attacks, pursue military service changes affecting ultra-Orthodox Israelis, and exclude religious extremists and ultra-nationalist populists from its coalition. Scheindlin said Netanyahu’s experience in coalition negotiations could still allow him to remain in office.

Same Facts. Different Perspectives.

Two AI models. Two viewpoints. One factual foundation.

The campaign is already being told as a fable: the sober general against the tainted politician. Gadi Eisenkot, former chief of staff, ahead of Likud in the polls, is supposed to be the man who finally puts October 7 behind Israel. Read what his own camp is advertising and the fable collapses. The program on offer is a state commission of inquiry, a draft fight with the ultra-Orthodox, and a coalition scrubbed of “religious extremists and ultra-nationalist populists.” That is not a war doctrine. It is a domestic settlement among people who already trust one another.

Israel is still living inside the consequences of the worst massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. Hamas has not been replaced by a political order that will not try it again. Hezbollah and Iran have not retired. Yet the alternative to Netanyahu is being sold, first, as a reckoning with Netanyahu. The strategy toward Gaza, the northern border, and the day after is treated as a detail. When the calling card of a would-be prime minister is an inquiry and a purged coalition, believe the calling card.

Eisenkot was not chief of staff on October 7. That will be offered as an alibi, and it is technically true. It is not an answer. From 2015 to 2019 he headed the IDF while the state practiced conflict management: periodic rounds, an underground barrier, Qatari cash into Gaza, and the settled belief that Hamas could be kept divided from the Palestinian Authority and afraid to jump the fence. Israelis have a name for that belief now, and they spit it. The conceptzia was not Netanyahu’s private hobby. It was the working consensus of the General Staff, the intelligence services, and the politicians who deferred to them. Putting one of its stewards in the prime minister’s chair and calling it a break with the past is how a failed class acquits itself.

A Right that cannot say the rest is not a Right. It is a fan club. Netanyahu preferred a contained Hamas to any choice that would have cost him his partners. He let an army form a mile from the kibbutzim. In 2023 he conducted a brawl over the judiciary as if the neighborhood were quiet. Itamar Ben-Gvir has been a gift to every foreign ministry that wants Israel to look like a riot with a flag. And the Haredi exemption, defended with coalition math while national-religious and Likud families bury their sons, is a moral scandal. Equal service is not a left-wing plot. After October 7 it is the least a Jewish state can ask of Jews. If the Right keeps mortgaging that duty to Shas and United Torah Judaism, it will have earned a beating.

Grant all of that, and Eisenkot’s offer is still the wrong remedy. A state commission sounds like truth and will operate as a prosecution. The government can order one; the president of the Supreme Court then appoints the chair and the members. The legal elite that spent the years before the massacre treating Netanyahu’s trial as the national emergency will staff the body that assigns blame for the massacre. Testimony should be taken under oath from generals and from the prime minister. Findings about the army will not arrive in the same voice as findings about the politician. Israel needs the facts. It does not need a verdict pre-written as the restoration of the correct people.

The exclusion is the tell. “Ultra-nationalist populists” is the salon phrase for voters who insist on sovereignty in Judea and Samaria, refuse a return to the Oslo security fantasy, and do not regard the General Staff as a priesthood. Their leaders can be undisciplined, provincial, and politically expensive. I have said so. Dislike is not a warrant to announce, before the ballots are counted, that their public cannot belong to a legitimate government. A draft law aimed at the Haredim already locks Shas and UTJ out. A cordon against the nationalist parties locks out the rest of the natural right. What remains is the path Israel already tried: a brittle “change” arrangement that reaches 61 by borrowing silence or support from the left and the Arab parties, then congratulates itself on moderation until the first hard vote.

This system does not crown the man who leads a poll. It crowns whoever assembles 61 seats. Netanyahu’s skill at that arithmetic is not a scam. It is the job. If Likud and its partners can do it, they will have won the only way this country recognizes. If they cannot, the Right should lose in the open — over its clowns, its draft evasion, and its share of October 7 — not be managed out of the state by a judges’ inquiry and a velvet rope.

October 7 did not happen because Israel was insufficiently embarrassed by its religious voters. It happened because the people entrusted with force stopped believing the enemy would use it. Handing the state back to that class, and calling the handover responsibility, is how you learn nothing.

How it may affect me

The result is settled by coalition math, not by who leads a party poll. After the vote, the president consults the factions and gives the first mandate to the lawmaker most likely to reach 61 of 120 seats; failure sends the chance elsewhere or back to another election. A state commission, once ordered, can compel testimony and publish findings that shape blame, careers, and the next war’s doctrine. A real draft reform would hit the exemption arrangements that still keep most ultra-Orthodox men out of regular service. Those are the decisions a 61-seat government will actually make.

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